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Abstract 
The worldwide diffusion of the good governance agenda and new public management has 
triggered a renewed focus on state capability and, more specifically, on the capability to 
raise revenue in developing countries. However, the analytical tools for a comprehensive 
understanding of the capability to raise revenue remain underdeveloped. This article aims 
at filling this gap and presents a model consisting of the three process dimensions 
‘information collection and processing’, ‘merit orientation’ and ‘administrative 
accountability’. ‘Revenue performance’ constitutes the fourth capability dimension which 
assesses tax administration’s output. This model is applied to the case of the Zambia 
Revenue Authority. The dimensions prove to be valuable not only for assessing the how 
much but also the how of collecting taxes. They can be a useful tool for future comparative 
analyses of tax administrations’ capabilities in developing countries. 
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Wie lässt sich die Leistungsfähigkeit der Steuererhebung messen? Prozess- und 
Output-Dimensionen und ihre Anwendung auf die Zambia Revenue Authority 
Die weltweite Verbreitung der Good-Governance- und New-Public-Management-
Konzepte hat zu einer zunehmenden Konzentration auf staatliche Leistungsfähigkeit und, 
im Besonderen, auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Steuererhebung in Entwicklungsländern 
geführt. Allerdings bleiben die analytischen Werkzeuge für ein umfassendes Verständnis 
von Leistungsfähigkeit unterentwickelt. Dieser Artikel stellt hierfür ein Modell vor, das 
die drei Prozess-Dimensionen „Sammeln und Verarbeiten von Informationen“, 
„Leistungsorientierung der Mitarbeiter“ und „Verantwortlichkeit der Verwaltung“ 
beinhaltet. „Einnahmeperformanz“ ist die vierte Dimension und erfasst den Output der 
Steuerverwaltung. Das mehrdimensionale Modell wird für die Analyse der 
Leistungsfähigkeit der Steuerbehörde Zambias (Zambia Revenue Authority) genutzt. Es 
erweist sich nicht nur für die Untersuchung des Wieviel, sondern auch des Wie des 
Erhebens von Steuern als wertvoll. Die vier Dimensionen können in Zukunft zur 
umfassenden und vergleichenden Analyse der Leistungsfähigkeit verschiedener 
Steuerverwaltungen in Entwicklungsländern genutzt werden. Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
Process and Output Dimensions and Their Application 
to the Zambia Revenue Authority 
Christian von Soest1 
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1. Introduction 
The international diffusion of the good governance agenda and of new public management 
(NPM) principles (Hood 1991) has induced the drive to measure state capability and the ca-
pability to raise revenue as a crucial state function which is often deficient, particularly in 
developing countries.2 However, measuring the capability to raise revenue3 is not as 
straightforward as it might appear at first glance. Bird (2003: 4) states that tax administration 
‘is inherently country-specific and surprisingly hard to quantify in terms of both outputs 
and inputs. The “best” tax administration is not simply that which collects the most reve-
nues’. As found by other scholars as well, there are no general, agreed upon measures which 
provide for the comparative assessment of a tax administration’s capability (Levi 1988: 5; 
Gillis 1989: 492; Taliercio 2004b: 12). 
                                                      
1  The empirical results presented in this article emanate from the author’s PhD on ‘The African State 
and the Capability to Raise Revenue. A Comparative Study on the Tax Administration in Zambia 
and Botswana’, submitted to the University of Leipzig. The author is indebted to Ulf Engel, Mat-
thias Basedau and Gero Erdmann, who all provided invaluable support and advice to his research 
project.  
2  An IMF study found that in some African countries more than 60% of the tax potential remains 
untapped (1997: 6-7). According to a World Bank report, in the Gambia losses associated with tax 
evasion even amounted to 70% of total public revenue (Dia 1993: 21). For further analysis on reve-
nue foregone in developing countries see for example Rose-Ackerman (2004: 29-30). 
3  In this article, the terms ‘taxes’ or ‘revenue’ encompass income taxes, value-added taxes and cus-
toms duties.  6  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
Recently, there have been various attempts to analytically capture the capability to raise 
revenue. It is undisputed in the literature that this has to include some measure of output, 
i.e. revenue collected by the tax administration. However, even this basic undertaking is 
fraught with problems as, due to hugely divergent economic structures and development 
levels of countries, a simple comparison of the amount of taxes collected is not feasible. Gal-
lagher (2005) therefore formulated a whole set of quantitative indicators for ‘benchmarking 
tax systems’. This strategy, however, still remains inadequate for comprehensively assessing 
the capability to raise revenue, as the process of collecting taxes fundamentally influences 
the output. 
Therefore, scholars sought to include ‘soft indicators’ such as the quality of assistance ren-
dered to taxpayers for fulfilling their obligations and perceptions of taxpayers in respect to 
tax administration (Klun 2004; Serra 2005). These approaches relate to the common finding 
that any capable tax administration must strive to induce taxpayers to comply (quasi-
)voluntarily with their obligations (Tanzi/Pellechio 1995: 10; Bird 2004: 138; Therkildsen 
2006: 4-5). Directly forcing every citizen to contribute to financing the state is an unrealistic – 
and unethical – endeavour. For Levi, paying taxes therefore ‘is voluntary because taxpayers 
choose to pay. It is quasi-voluntary because the noncompliant are subject to coercion – if they 
are caught’ (1988: 52, emphasis in original). A fair and equitable application of the tax code 
induces citizens to pay their taxes (e.g. Fjeldstad 2004). 
This article sets out to move this discussion forward and to include process dimensions, 
which crucially affect quasi-voluntary compliance and, in turn, a tax administration’s out-
put, into a comprehensive model of the capability to raise revenue. It starts by introducing 
the four dimensions of capability and then applies the model to the analysis of the Zambia 
Revenue Authority (ZRA). This second step serves to test the empirical utility of the frame-
work. 
 
 
2. Modelling the Capability to Raise Revenue 
It is useful to analytically differentiate between process and output as two interrelated ele-
ments of capability. The process deals with the ‘how’ of tax collection. The output on the 
other hand refers to the extent the tax administration is able to fulfil its core task, the collec-
tion of revenue (‘how much’).4 As the collection of taxes is its ultimate goal, a revenue-
                                                      
4  Other scholars draw a similar distinction between process and output (Eriksen 1999), albeit with 
semantic differences. Gillis (1989: 493) for instance speaks of ‘revenue and nonrevenue objectives’, 
whereas Tanzi/Pellechio (1995) distinguish between ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’. In contrast, 
Boesen and Therkildsen (2005: 1-5; 2004: 10-17) advocate a more restricted understanding of ad-von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue  7 
collecting institution can only be termed to have a high capability to raise revenue if it gen-
erates a significant output. 
Aiming at a comprehensive analysis of process and output, the four capability dimensions 
‘information collection and processing’, ‘merit orientation’, ‘administrative accountability’ 
and ‘revenue performance’ will be used. The first three process dimensions inherently shape 
revenue performance, the output dimension of capability. These four dimensions all consti-
tute the building blocks of the model of the capability to raise revenue. 
 
Information Collection and Processing 
Knowledge about the empirical reality stands at the basis of every adequate political and 
administrative decision. Information collection and processing therefore constitutes the pre-
condition for capability (Callaghy 1990: 265; Osborne/Gaebler 1992: 147; Moore 1998: 105). 
At the same time, researchers have repeatedly found that basic data in developing countries 
are missing or of a low quality (Hilderbrand/Grindle 1997: 46; Olsen 2001: 152). In effect, 
many governments and public administrations are ‘blind’, i.e. cannot base their decisions on 
precise information. 
The tax administration is particularly dependent on data. For Bird, it ‘is first and foremost 
an organization dealing with information’ (2003: 20). All of the three basic tasks of a tax ad-
ministration, the identification of taxpayers, the assessment of tax liabilities and the collec-
tion of taxes require adequate data. In consequence, this capability dimension stands at the 
basis for enforcement, as the taxpayers’ perception of the probability of detection of tax eva-
sion strongly determines their degree of quasi-voluntary compliance (Silvani/Baer 1997: 22; 
Taliercio 2004a: 216). The present article uses taxpayer audits and the active registration of 
taxpayers as indicators for the collection of information by the tax administration. 
In order not to ‘loose’ information, which might have been actively collected, any tax ad-
ministration must adequately utilise it. The use of computers and special tax administration 
software are the indicators for this second aspect of ‘information collection and processing’ 
(Gill 2003: 19; Smith 2003: 19; Silvani/Baer 1997: 19). 
 
Merit Orientation 
Merit orientation reflects the rationality of service of tax officers. In their statistical analysis 
of bureaucracies in 35 developing countries, Rauch and Evans (1999) found that meritocratic 
recruitment and promotion of civil servants to a large extent define the capability of the pub-
                                                                                                                                                                     
ministrative capability which focuses on results, i.e. outputs rather than process and output. For 
them, ‘performance is the process leading to outputs’ (Boesen/Therkildsen 2004: 66). 8  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
lic administration.5 Recruitment of staff proved to be by far the most important variable with 
predictable promotion of civil servants showing a weaker correlation. The effect of competi-
tive salaries on bureaucratic capability remained unclear (Rauch/Evans 2000: 68). 
Despite this latter finding, it is intuitively comprehensible that absent, irregular or extremely 
low pay massively affects civil servants’ merit orientation. Sideline employment to survive, 
sanction immunity and, in the extreme, the ‘privatisation’ of the public administration are 
potential consequences (Olowu 1999: 13). Adequate remuneration also reduces the incen-
tives for petty corruption in the public and tax administration (van Rijckeghem/Weder 1997; 
Bird 2004: 141).6 
Predictable promotion processes based on merit induce professionalism and inhibit the poli-
tisation of the public administration: ‘To ensure that they make objective decisions and ap-
ply rules impartially, public bureaucrats should be allowed to remain in their positions 
without fear of political retribution’ (Goldsmith 1999: 539f.). Both features, merit-oriented 
recruitment and promotion, also enhance the probability for an ‘organisational culture’ 
which focuses on performance.7 This in turn allows a public administration to attain high 
levels of capability even if it is situated in an unfavourable environment (Grindle 1997; Hil-
derbrand/Grindle 1997: 51). Through the four indicators recruitment, promotion, remunera-
tion and organisational culture this process dimension establishes whether the tax admini-
strations’ human resource management predominately follows merit principles or not. 
 
Administrative Accountability 
Fair implementation of the tax code enhances taxpayers’ willingness to comply with their 
obligations without being forced, i.e. quasi-voluntarily (Taliercio 2004a: 217). Three aspects 
of this administrative accountability are relevant for the capability to raise revenue: corrup-
tion levels within the tax administration, taxpayer rights and education of as well as assis-
tance rendered to taxpayers by the tax administration. 
First, a high incidence of corruption among tax officers is likely to reduce tax compliance 
(Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 28; Fjeldstad/Tungodden 2003: 1459; Fjeldstad et al. 2000: 5). In this 
case taxpayers perceive the tax administration to be unfair, i.e. to not treating every taxpayer 
                                                      
5  They examined the correlation of the three public administration features with economic growth. 
Applying the same research design to a sample of 20 African countries, Court et al. (1999) con-
firmed Rauch and Evans’ findings.  
6  However, it is not possible to draw a simple correlation between higher salaries and lower corrup-
tion. Fjeldstad and Rakner (2003: vii) state that ‘without extensive and effective monitoring, wage 
increases may produce a highly paid but also highly corrupt tax administration’ (see also Fjeld-
stad/Therkildsen 2004: 3; Hilderbrand/Grindle 1997: 51).  
7  Evans and Rauch (1999), referring to Weber, term organisational culture ‘esprit de corps’.  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue  9 
equally and of misusing their money. Furthermore, corruption within the tax administration 
directly reduces state revenue as civil servants in this case put money in their own pockets 
instead of state coffers. This aspect of administrative accountability is of particular impor-
tance as tax and, particularly, customs officers collecting revenue on behalf of the state and 
interacting with taxpayers, are highly exposed to corrupt inducements (McLinden 2005: 76-
78; Walsh 2003: 61-62). The fight against corruption within the tax administration serves as 
the indicator for this aspect of administrative accountability. 
Second, taxpayers in many developing countries have few rights in relation to the tax ad-
ministration. Tax officers often collect revenue by means of coercion (Luoga 2002: 50; Moore 
2004: 17, en. 20). Accordingly, there is a need for revenue authorities to take account of tax-
payer rights. Taxpayers must have the opportunity to appeal if they feel unjustly treated by 
the tax administration. As it fundamentally increases the taxpayers’ ‘trust in the fairness of 
the revenue administration’ (Gill 2003: 17), the quality of the appeals process serves as the 
main indicator for assessing taxpayer rights. 
Finally, taxpayer education and services, i.e. information and assistance rendered to the tax-
paying public, are instrumental for lowering ‘compliance costs’ (LeBaube/Vehorn 1992: 310, 
333; Taliercio 2004a: 216).8 Taxpayer education furthermore forms the basis for a general 
awareness of the necessity and the mechanism of paying taxes (Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 27). 
Accordingly, the quality of taxpayer education and services constitutes the third indicator 
for administrative accountability. 
 
Revenue Performance 
Revenue performance constitutes the ultimate goal of any tax administration. However, as 
outlined, there does not exist one widely accepted indicator for this output dimension of the 
capability to raise revenue.9 Researchers, tax administrators and donor agencies often focus 
on the tax-to-GDP ratio for assessing revenue performance. However, it will be shown that a 
sole focus on this indicator is insufficient for adequately reflecting administrative perform-
ance. In addition, the amount of direct taxes collected, and the tax gap, meaning the differ-
ence between (estimated) tax potential and tax actually collected need to be incorporated 
into the analysis. 
To start with, the tax-to-GDP ratio is a readily available indicator ‘that gives a sense of the 
fiscal pressure’ of a country (Gill 2003: 2). Yet, tax revenue raised not only is a function of the 
                                                      
8  ‘Compliance costs’ in this respect can be understood as ‘the ease with which taxpayers can pay 
taxes’ (Tanzi/Shome 1994: 333). 
9  On measuring revenue performance see also Lieberman (2002), Gill (2003) and Delay et al. (1999: 
61-67). 10  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
tax administration’s capability but is also dependent on environmental factors that lie be-
yond the administration’s influence. Socio-economic and political variables such as tax legis-
lation fundamentally influence the tax-to-GDP ratio. ‘This means that tax burden differences 
may not in themselves tell us much about possible untapped tax bases and about the politics 
of taxation’ (Therkildsen 2005: 45; see also Gill 2003: 2; Stotsky/WoldeMariam 1997: 10; 
Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 18; Lieberman 2002: 98). The comparison of a country’s tax-to-GDP 
ratio only indicates whether it is above or below average in relation to other countries and 
whether it has changed over time. 
The collection of income taxes vis-à-vis other tax types serves as additional indicator for 
revenue performance. Direct taxes are administratively and politically ‘difficult’ because 
they are visible and ‘felt’ by a majority of the population and often touch on powerful politi-
cal actors (Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 32; Burgess/Stern 1993: 818). Therefore, direct taxes on in-
come, profits and property are harder for developing countries to successfully capture than 
indirect consumption taxes or customs duties (Thirsk 1997: 18, 30; Lieberman 2002: 99, 107; 
2003: 53, 61; Burgess/Stern 1993: 770). As a result, the collection of direct taxes is a particu-
larly valid indicator for revenue performance. 
The ‘tax gap’, i.e. the difference between tax potential and tax actually collected, forms a ma-
jor challenge for tax administrations in developing countries. Often, a large part of economic 
activity is pursued and the majority of the population work in the informal, i.e. unregistered 
sector of the economy. Due to its dispersed nature, taxing the informal sector is administra-
tively difficult (Gërxhani 2004: 289).10 The tax administration’s inroads into this part of the 
economy will serve as the third indicator of revenue performance. In doing this, one must be 
aware of the fact that this gap is very hard to precisely quantify. 
In sum, the four-dimensional ‘Model of the Capability to Raise Revenue’ (see Figure 1) con-
sists of three process dimensions which all provide insights on how the tax administration 
raises revenue. They crucially determine tax administration’s output, captured by the reve-
nue performance dimension.11 In the next step, the four-dimensional model will be applied 
for exemplary analysing the capability of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). 
 
 
                                                      
10   It is important to note that not only impoverished people are active in this part of the economy but 
also genuine tax evaders who could afford to provide significant contributions to financing the 
state. On the general problem of taxing the informal sector see for example Gërxhani (2004) and 
Tendler (2002). 
11  The model also depicts the environment potentially influencing the capability to raise revenue. A 
detailed analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this article and can be found in von Soest 
(2006). For an insightful conceptualisation of ‘context’ see also Boesen/Therkildsen (2004: 24-33).  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue  11 
Figure 1: Model of the Capability to Raise Revenue 
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3. Analysing the Zambia Revenue Authority’s Capability 
The capability to raise revenue is particularly deficient in sub-Saharan Africa. The continent 
today is the most donor-dependent region in the world (World Bank Africa Database 2005; 
Olsen 2001: 147). Generally, scholars argue that high levels of financial aid significantly re-
duce governments’ incentive to extract domestic revenue (Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 2; Ther-
kildsen 2002: 41; Moore 1998: 110). Development aid can be understood as an administra-
tively and politically ‘easy tax’, i.e. ‘unearned income’ (Olsen 2001: 168).12 It can therefore be 
                                                      
12  On the concept of ‘unearned income’ see Moore (1998: 84-88). A statistical analysis of domestic 
revenue responses to inflows of foreign aid in 107 countries from 1970 to 2000 found that from 12  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
assumed that there is a circular relationship between strong donor dependency and weak 
capability to raise revenue. This makes donor-dependent countries particular relevant case 
studies for assessing the process and output of tax collection. 
Zambia has heavily relied on external development aid and – similar to other African states 
– has also been characterised by a very unfavourable environment for the collection of 
taxes.13 The four capability dimensions will be used for assessing the process and the output 
of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), which was founded to overcome the deficiencies 
of Zambia’s old, state-integrated tax administration.14 
In 1994 this revenue agency, following new public management prescriptions (Devas et al. 
2001), was launched. The analysis will reveal how this reform project has influenced capabil-
ity and, in turn, how much revenue is collected by the ZRA.15 It is based on a broad range of 
primary and secondary sources and three months of fieldwork in Zambia. Six respondent 
groups from inside as well as outside the tax administration were interviewed.16 
 
Active Collection and Computerised Processing of Information 
Tax administration in developing countries often operates as a passive recipient of informa-
tion rather than as active collector. In these cases, the provision of data on taxable income 
remains dependent upon the taxpayers’ goodwill. Radian (1980) aptly refers to this behav-
iour as ‘tellering’ as opposed to ‘collecting’. 
In contrast, the ZRA has pursued an active, or in other words, aggressive approach of col-
lecting information on taxpayer income. The tax authority closely supervises large compa-
                                                                                                                                                                     
each US Dollar of aid in the form of grants, 28 percent was offset by reduced domestic revenue ef-
fort (Gupta et al. 2003: 12-13). 
13  Posner and Simon (2002: 331) portray Zambia as a ‘modal case’ in the African context.  
14  The old tax administration only invariably controlled taxpayers, had a shortage of qualified staff 
and managers, did rarely protect taxpayers’ rights, and was plagued by high corruption-levels. As 
a consequence of Zambia’s severe economic crisis and these internal deficiencies, the tax-to-GDP 
ratio nearly halved from around 30% at independence to 15.3% in 1993 before the start of the ZRA 
(Republic of Zambia 1969: 10; Coopers and Lybrand 1992: par. 1; World Bank 2003: 15). For more 
detailed analysis see von Soest (2006).  
15  Because the assessment through the four capability dimensions predominately serves to apply the 
model for empirical work, the analysis of the ZRA’s capability necessarily is selective and brief. 
Advance apologies are offered for the rough brush used and injustices to empirical reality, that in-
evitably result.  
16  Field work was conducted from 4 March to 27 May 2004. The respondent groups were tax officers 
from a) the management level and from b) middle / low hierarchy levels, business persons, civil 
society representatives, politicians and policy makers, social scientists and employees from inter-
national organisations. In order to protect them from negative consequences, the names of the re-
spondents cited in this article were made anonymous. A list of all respondents and the transcripts 
of the interviews can be obtained from the author on request. Research permission granted by the 
Zambia Revenue Authority is greatly acknowledged. von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue  13 
nies, the most important sources of revenue. According to officials from the Division of 
Taxes, their unit on average audits Zambia’s national electricity utility five times per year, 
for instance. Insufficient coordination has further increased the frequency of audits carried 
out by the different Divisions Direct Taxes, VAT and – to a lesser extent – Customs and Ex-
cise. These ad hoc and uncoordinated surveillance efforts featured among the most common 
business complaints in respect to the revenue authority (see also section on taxpayer rights). 
One business person jokingly remarked that ‘they are always sitting in my office as I would 
employ them.’ 
As a capable tax administration has to systematically deal with a high amount of informa-
tion, practitioners regard the use of information technology, i.e. computers, as a crucial fea-
ture of successful tax administration reform projects.17 Information technology is also seen as 
a necessary tool for reducing customs officials’ discretion, and in turn lowering corruption 
levels (De Wulf/McLinden 2005: 309). Accordingly, the computerisation of the Customs Di-
vision has been one of the first priorities of donors and the ZRA management. The computer 
programme ASYCUDA (‘Automated System for Customs Data’), which standardises the 
customs clearance process, became operational in early 2000 with the complete implementa-
tion project being finished in April 2001 (Republic of Zambia 2001: 21; Hill 2004: 141). 
Computerised systems are also in place for processing VAT. They allow the responsible offi-
cers to disaggregate revenue performance by income group, occupation and gender and to 
predict future risks for revenue (Gray et al. 2001: 32, 42). After some delays, the ZRA in 2004 
finally introduced the computer programme ‘Integrated Tax Administration System’ (ITAS) 
which merged the old VAT software with the database of the Taxes Division. This integra-
tion is useful, as defaulting direct taxes tends to be highly correlated with evading indirect 
taxes and vice versa (Gray et al. 2001: 43). 
In summary, the ZRA has turned Zambia’s formerly passive tax administration into one that 
actively collects information and processes it through modern information technology. It 
appears that the revenue authority has made significant progress in establishing taxpayers’ 
liabilities. 
 
Leaps Forward in Merit Orientation 
The semi-autonomous ZRA has from the outset pursued its own recruitment policy inde-
pendently from the rest of Zambia’s civil service. Recruits for the well-paid and, in turn, 
                                                      
17  See Berman and Tettey (2001) for a critical account of ‘computer fixes’ in African public admini-
stration. 14  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
sought-after positions are hired on the basis of interviews and aptitude tests.18 Before the au-
thority was launched, every civil servant had to reapply in order to be employed by the new 
institution. Respondents stated that this procedure was largely successful in selecting the 
most qualified and motivated tax officers from the former Departments of Taxes and Cus-
toms and Excise. Later, the ZRA introduced a minimum qualification policy, meaning that 
every employee, starting from the middle level, must hold a diploma or a higher degree 
from university. Many of the ZRA’s high-ranking officers today hold a degree from the Brit-
ain-based Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). 
However, the authority’s basic orientation was given by expatriate managers financed by 
the British Department for International Development (DFID) and not by local managers. 
None of the four most senior managers in 1995 was Zambian. Foreign leadership was 
thought to be less responsive to local social networks and to political interference (Kasanga 
1996: 21; Delay et al. 1999: 23; Gray/Chapman 2001: 40). Furthermore, until September 2004, 
the Project Manager of DFID’s support project was based within the revenue authority’s 
headquarters.19 It was only nine years after the creation of the tax agency, when the last 
manager from abroad left. 
The ZRA’s human resources policy, in accordance with new public management prescrip-
tions, departs substantially from the classic public administration approach of life-long em-
ployment and promotion in line with seniority principles (Polidano 2001; Batley 1999). 
Zambian tax officers now experience a weak job security as they are only employed on the 
basis of five-year contracts (in the beginning, the period used to be three years). The man-
agement can decline to offer a new contract without giving any explanation. This system has 
been a much debated issue within the organisation and the perceptions vary widely among 
staff. They ranged from outright resentment to an appreciation of its performance enhancing 
effects. The managers view the contract system as a necessary incentive to create a business-
driven work ethic among its staff. A human resource officer maintained: ‘If you don’t have a 
stick, people start getting lazy. […] It is at a harsh level but if a culture of performance is en-
trenched you don’t need contracts anymore.’ 
Today, after more than ten years of operation, most of the authority’s employees have 
worked for the private sector before and see themselves as well-qualified professionals. In 
                                                      
18  The ZRA salary for certain positions is approximately eight times higher than for similar positions 
in the public sector. For Tanzania, Fjeldstad (2002: 8) reports that the salary for some tax officers 
was up to ten times higher than the one from corresponding positions in the public sector. 
19  The official name of DFID’s technical assistance project was ‘Revenue Institutions in Zambia En-
hanced Support’ (RIZES). Its project office was based on the 10th floor of the ‘Revenue House’ in 
Zambia’s capital Lusaka.  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue  15 
general, this self-perception was mirrored by business persons who saw the revenue author-
ity as an organisation, which fares much better than the rest of Zambia’s public sector. 
 
Mixed Results in Administrative Accountability 
Zambia’s tax collecting institutions have traditionally experienced a high incidence of cor-
ruption. In response, the ZRA has pursued a tough stance against bribery and kickbacks. An 
Internal Affairs Unit serves as the authority’s corporate body for preventing and fighting 
corruption. It has fairly wide powers and is equipped comparatively well. In addition, the 
ZRA’s annual reports have regularly listed the number of corruption cases, their completion 
rate and the time required for their processing (e.g. ZRA 2004: 19-20; 2005: 16). 
In interviews with business representatives, corruption at the ZRA did not feature as a ma-
jor concern. The picture, however, remains inconclusive. Following Hill (2004: 137), ‘there 
continued to be reliable reports of corruption […] at high levels’. This suspicion is fuelled by 
regular newspaper reports on incidents of misconduct at the revenue authority (e.g. Zambia 
Daily Mail 6.4.2004; Times of Zambia 30.3.2004; Zambia Daily Mail 30.3.2004; 3.9.2003). In a 
2002 report from the Zambia chapter of the NGO Transparency International, the ZRA fea-
tured among the public institutions with significant corruption levels (TIZ 2002: 34, 38). Par-
ticularly the problems at ZRA’s Customs and Excise Division seem to seriously reduce the 
authority’s administrative accountability. 
The common perception is that corrupt activities of ZRA employees have increased in recent 
years.20 This is consistent with research indicating that ‘any beneficial anti-corruption effect 
that a revenue project might have is likely to be short-lived’ (Gray/Chapman 2001: 8, em-
phasis removed; see also Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 17). Following the argument, a revenue au-
thority struggles to keep internal corruption at low levels when such a project is not flanked 
by government-wide activities to eradicate corruption, i.e. attempts to create a more favour-
able environment. Indeed, Zambia has from 1998 to 2005 consistently received low scores on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The country has always 
been ranked in the worse half, for most of the time among the worst third of countries rated 
in the CPI (Internet Center for Corruption Research 2005). 
Taxpayer rights are an additional aspect of administrative accountability. In 1992, two years 
before the launch of the ZRA, a Tax Policy Task Force made a strong case to ‘[r]evitalize the 
tax appeals process to protect taxpayer rights’ (TPTF 1992: 4). In response, a special Revenue 
Appeals Tribunal, which works autonomously under the Ministry of Justice’s auspices, was 
installed (ZRA 2000: 23). The Tribunal has on average ruled on 50 to 60 cases per year and, 
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although there has been a backlog of cases, respondents maintained that the body operates 
more professionally and faster than Zambia’s normal court system. 
However, the Revenue Appeals Tribunal is a mechanism of last resort with limited rele-
vance to the day-to-day interaction between taxpayers and the ZRA. A much bigger issue 
for business have been the aggressive enforcement strategies applied by the ZRA. Business 
representatives complained that the revenue authority concentrates ‘heavily’ on the formal 
sector of the economy, which is registered and visible to the tax administration (see also 
Gray et al. 2001: 25). They widely perceived these frequent tax audits as harassment. 
Yet, focussing on large businesses is rational for the ZRA. The effort needed to raise a high 
amount of revenue from large registered companies is lower than from the dispersed infor-
mal sector. Infringing taxpayer rights might therefore also be a consequence of the inherent 
incentive structure of revenue authorities, whose success is measured primarily against the 
tax collection output, i.e. revenue performance.21 Similarly, scholars report complaints about 
harassment from other revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa (Smith 2003: 7, 18). Ther-
kildsen for instance finds that Uganda’s revenue authority ‘has brought a good deal of fear 
into the relationship [with taxpayers]’ (2004: 73). 
The ZRA has fared better in respect to information and services rendered to taxpayers. One 
of the main means has been the revenue authority’s Advice Centre, which was opened in 
2000. Based at the headquarters in the capital Lusaka, it serves as the ‘one-stop shop’ (ZRA 
2003: 9) for the interaction between taxpayers and the revenue authority. It attempts to ‘treat 
taxpayers as customers’, stated the Head of ZRA’s responsible Executive Support Unit. The 
authority’s homepage and leaflets as well as regular participation in public radio pro-
grammes have been further means of disseminating information (Fjeldstad 2005: 4). 
On balance, the revenue authority’s aggressive enforcement tactics infringe on taxpayer 
rights and the high incidence of corruption tarnishes the organisation’s integrity image. De-
spite efforts to inform taxpayers, the administrative accountability of Zambia’s tax admini-
stration has therefore displayed only mixed results and can be seen as the weakest of the 
three process dimensions. The question now to be answered is how the strengthened first 
two process dimensions and the varying administrative accountability have affected the 
ZRA’s revenue performance. 
 
Increased Revenue Performance, but Hardly Inroads in Informal Sector 
The indicators show that the ZRA has improved important indicators of revenue perform-
ance compared to its predecessor institutions. The tax-to-GDP ratio went up from 15.3 to 
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18.7% in the ZRA’s first year of operation (World Bank 2003: 15). In the following years, 
however, the tax-to-GDP ratio has largely remained stagnant, with a slight decrease to 17.5% 
in 2004 (IMF 2006: 35). Since 2000, Zambia’s economy has grown with 4.4% on average with 
no increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio (IMF 2005: 55). Only in the beginning, the major factors 
depressing the tax-to-GDP ratio lay beyond the ZRA’s influence and must be attributed to 
its environment, e.g. the tax policy and economic development (Rakner/Gloppen 2003: 97, 
en. 6). This indicates that the ZRA has hardly been able to participate in the growing tax 
base. 
The ZRA has left unresolved the administratively (and politically) demanding task of ex-
panding direct taxation. Affirmed by a DFID-study, the revenue authority’s impact on direct 
tax incidence has remained ‘modest’ (Gray et al. 2001: 12; see also Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 31). 
Income tax collection has never amounted to more than 8% of GDP – not even in the most 
recent years with comparatively strong economic growth (IMF 2004: 35; 2006: 35). 
A further problem has been the lacking outreach to all parts of the economy and society. 
Revenue collection has largely been confined to formalised economic activity. With formal 
sector employment accounting for only about 500,000 in a country of more than eleven mil-
lion people, the burden of income tax is ‘skewed towards the few individuals in the tradi-
tional formal sector’ (Republic of Zambia 2001: 18; see also Gray et al. 2001: 21). It has not 
featured among the organisation’s priorities to tax the informal sector. As a result, Zambia’s 
tax gap has remained large. 
The ZRA’s revenue performance has developed similarly as the one of other African reve-
nue authorities (Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 17): A first phase of increased tax collection has been 
followed by stagnation or even decline of the tax-to-GDP ratio. This cannot only be attrib-
uted to the political rationale of leaving large voter segments untaxed, but also goes back to 
administrative interests as the taxation of the informal sector runs counter to the business-
oriented logic of the ZRA. Additionally, the collection of income taxes has remained at a 
comparatively low level. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
It has been the ZRA’s biggest success that it now is a professional body run by qualified per-
sonnel. ‘Strong’ expatriate managers have instilled merit orientation with minimum qualifi-
cation standards acting against political interference with the recruitment and progression of 
staff. As a result, politicians intervene less with human resource management than seems to 18  von Soest: Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue 
be the case in other African countries’ revenue authorities (for Uganda see Therkildsen 2004: 
73). The second dimension accounting for the revenue authority’s relative success has been 
the enhanced collection and processing of taxpayer data. Thus, two process dimensions 
show remarkably positive results for a tax administration operating in the setting of a low-
income country. 
However, the ZRA’s strong enforcement tactics went hand-in-hand with infringements of 
taxpayer rights. Increases in revenue performance are less attributable to quasi-voluntary 
compliance than to close taxpayer surveillance. Furthermore, corruption levels are still 
high.22 Based on multi-dimensional analysis, this article therefore draws a more cautious 
conclusion than Fjeldstad (2005), who seems to predominately attribute the revenue author-
ity’s success to the provision of improved taxpayer services and information. This result 
supports the increasing consensus that any capable tax administration must give careful 
consideration to taxpayer rights and taxpayer opinion in exercising its functions (Klun 2004: 
573; Serra 2005: 123). 
It implies that apart from Zambia’s unfavourable economic environment and tax exemp-
tions, particularly the deficient administrative accountability has diminished the scope for 
further increasing revenue performance. As a consequence, stabilising the tax-to-GDP ratio 
at around 18%, is a success the revenue authority has to be credited with. However, incorpo-
rating the collection of direct taxes and the outreach into the informal economic sector into 
the analysis, the picture looks less favourable. 
Methodologically, the exemplary analysis of the ZRA demonstrates the need to go beyond 
narrow, output-focussed performance indicators in assessing the capability to raise revenue. 
The three process dimensions, information collection and processing, merit orientation and 
administrative accountability, not only provide insights on how the tax administration raises 
revenue but also crucially determine tax administration’s revenue performance. It shows 
that – as in other African countries – increased revenue output in Zambia is predominately 
caused by coercion, not by consent. 
The model of the capability to raise revenue allows tracing this complex interdependence 
between the process and the output of collecting taxes. It can form the basis for the future 
comprehensive analysis of different tax administrations’ capabilities to raise revenue. This 
would also serve to come to realistic appraisals of – often heavily donor-supported – tax 
administration reform projects in developing countries. 
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